This paper studies the choice between investment in new and used capital. We argue that used capital inherently relaxes credit constraints and thus firms which are credit constrained invest in used capital. Used capital is cheap relative to new capital in terms of its purchase price but requires substantial maintenance payments later on. The timing of these investment cash outflows makes used capital attractive for credit constrained firms. While used capital is expensive when evaluated using the discount factor of an agent with a high level of internal funds, it is relatively cheap when evaluated from the vantage point of a credit constrained agent with few internal funds. We provide an overlapping generations model and determine the price of used capital in equilibrium. Agents with less internal funds are more credit constrained, invest in used capital, and start smaller firms. Empirically, we find that the fraction of investment in used capital is substantially higher for small firms and varies significantly with measures of financial constraints with the predicted sign. JEL Classification: D92; E22; G31. * We thank
Introduction
Why invest in used capital rather than new capital? We argue that firms which are credit constrained purchase used capital because the timing of the necessary cash outflows is such that used capital relaxes credit constraints. The purchase price of used capital is lower than that of new capital. However unlike new capital, used capital requires substantial maintenance payments down the road. The timing inherent in these cash flows makes used capital more attractive to firms which are credit constrained at the time of investment. By investing in used capital, constrained firms can operate at a larger scale.
We find that, indeed, small firms and credit constrained firms invest significantly more in used capital. Used capital comprises more than twenty five percent of capital expenditures for the smallest firms, compared to around ten percent for the largest firms. Moreover, capital expenditures on used capital relative to total capital expenditures are significantly related to empirical measures of financial constraints with the predicted sign. These facts are not only important for understanding used capital markets, but also because of the focus on the investment behavior of small, credit constrained firms in studies of business cycles and economic growth. Since a significant fraction of these firms' investment is in used capital, it is important to consider capital reallocation as well as net new investment in explaining aggregate investment dynamics.
We develop an overlapping generations model in order to study the decision to invest in new or used capital along with the equilibrium in the market for used capital. New and used capital are perfect substitutes in production, but used capital requires a maintenance payment subsequent to purchase. Agents can only borrow against a fraction of the resale value of capital and differ in their initial endowments of internal funds. We find that agents which have few internal funds are credit constrained, invest in used capital, and start smaller firms.
In equilibrium, used capital is expensive when valued using the discount factor of an unconstrained firm, but cheap when valued at the discount factor of a constrained firm. The opposite is true for new capital. The variation in the multiplier on the credit constraint introduces a wedge between the valuations of constrained and unconstrained investors. We show that any agent who invests in used capital in fact must be credit constrained. Thus, one can observe how credit constrained a firm is through revealed preference in the choice between new and used capital. The conve-nience yield used capital provides by relaxing constrained agents' credit constraints pushes up the equilibrium price of used capital so that it becomes expensive for unconstrained agents. Moreover, since capital can be sold as used capital after use in production, the higher equilibrium price of used capital in the presence of constrained agents makes investment in new capital even more attractive to unconstrained agents.
We provide a condition for the value of used capital to deviate from that of new capital when both are evaluated by an unconstrained agent, that is, we provide a condition for the equilibrium price of used capital to exceed its value to unconstrained agents. In this case, the price of used capital exceeds the price of new capital minus the maintenance costs discounted at the discount factor of an unconstrained agent. We call this a credit constrained pricing equilibrium since the fact that there are credit constrained investors in the economy is reflected in the pricing of used capital. We call an equilibrium where unconstrained agents value new and used capital equally an unconstrained pricing equilibrium. We also characterize in closed form the levels of internal funds for which agents invest in used or new capital, or both, in each type of equilibrium. In both cases, the fraction of capital investment comprised by used capital is decreasing in firm size, and increasing in how credit constrained the firm is.
We find empirically that the fraction of investment comprised by used capital is indeed decreasing with firm size and varies significantly with measures of financial constraints with the predicted sign. We use data from the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS) and data from the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey (ACES), which samples nonfarm businesses, both by the Bureau of the Census. We are among the first to use the ACES micro data.
1 We use data from Compustat for financial variables. Owners of smaller vehicle fleets purchase a much larger fraction of their fleet used than those with large fleets. Similarly, the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is considerably (about five times) larger for businesses with no employees than for businesses with employees. About thirty percent of aggregate used capital expenditures are done by small businesses, while these businesses contribute only about eight percent of aggregate capital expenditures. Moreover, for businesses with employees, the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital decreases across asset size deciles from about 27% in the smallest size decile to about 10% in largest size decile. We argue that, as in our model, smaller businesses are more likely to be credit constrained, and therefore purchase more used capital which in turn relaxes these constraints. We also show that the fraction of investment in used capital varies significantly with measures of financial constraints with the predicted sign: firms which pay higher dividends (relative to assets), have lower leverage, and have more cash (relative to assets) have a significantly lower fraction of used capital expenditures. Differences in factor prices may also give rise to variation in firms' decision to invest in new vs. used capital. Bond (1983 Bond ( , 1985 develops a model with exogenous heterogeneity in factor prices where firms or sectors with low capacity utilization and low labor costs but high capital costs choose used capital since low labor costs and capacity utilization rates are complementary with the associated production downtime. Variation in factor prices is not correlated with how quickly machines can be fixed, or with productivity in maintaining them. In contrast to our paper, the focus in Bond's model, which is static, is on the relative magnitude of maintenance costs, not on the timing of such payments. Factor price variation has been used to understand trade in used capital across countries, where variation in such prices may be considerable, by Sen (1962) and Smith (1976) .
Our work is also related to studies of vintage capital, durable goods, and the effects of credit constraints on investment. In standard vintage capital models the choice between new and used capital is determined by preferences for different vintages. Similarly, the choice between high and low quality durables is often modeled using exogenous preferences for quality. The results in this paper shed light on how these preferences over new and used capital, or goods of high and low quality, might be determined by underlying constraints on the investment decision, and hence complements these studies.
2 Moreover, our paper is related to studies of the effects of credit constraints on investment decisions. 3 The results of our model imply that the 2 For vintage capital models, see Benhabib and Rustichini (1991) , Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997) , Campbell (1998), and Jovanovic (1998) . For models of durable goods markets with exogenous preferences over quality, see, for example, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) for a dynamic adverse selection model with sorting of new and used goods to heterogeneous consumers, Stolyarov (2002) for a model where goods deteriorate with age and volume varies with vintage, and Berkovec (1985) , Porter and Sattler (1999) , and Adda and Cooper (2000) for simulated discrete choice models and associated empirical tests in the automobile market.
3 For a survey, see Hubbard (1998) . For empirical tests of constrained and unconstrained firms' investment Euler equations, see Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) . For models describing degree of a firm's credit constraints can be identified through revealed preference in the choice between new and used capital. This is important because although shifts in investment opportunities drive total capital expenditures, it is not clear that they should affect the new vs. used composition of such expenditures. Finally, this paper is in part motivated by our previous work on capital reallocation (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2003) ).
4 There we find that capital reallocation is procyclical while the benefits of reallocation, in terms of measures of cross sectional dispersion of productivity, seem countercyclical. We conclude that the reallocation frictions must be higher in bad times. Could this be explained by the fact that firms are more credit constrained in bad times? This is not clear since while that would make it harder for potential buyers to buy used capital it might at the same time make potential sellers more eager to sell since they too are more credit constrained. Thus, one might ask: Who buys used capital? Here we study this question and provide both a theory and evidence that it is the more credit constrained firms who buy used capital. This may then be part of the explanation why there is less capital reallocation in bad times.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our model of new and used capital investment decisions, along with the associated equilibrium in the used capital market. We characterize constrained and unconstrained pricing equilibria. We present a numerical example of an economy in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical evidence and conclude in Section 5.
the effects of variation in net worth on credit constraints, see Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . For evidence that leverage affects overall investment in the trucking industry, see Zingales (1998) . For models and evidence of distortions in durable goods consumption from credit constraints, see, for example, Chah, Ramey, and Starr (1995) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2003) . Finally, for a general model of investment with a wedge between the purchase price and sale price of capital in the absence of credit constraints see Abel and Eberly (1994) .
4 For more on the literature on capital reallocation see Eisfeldt and Rampini (2003, 2004) and papers cited therein. 5 See also Eisfeldt (2004) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2004) for additional mechanisms which render reallocation frictions countercyclical.
Credit Constraints and the Purchase of Used

Capital
In this section we consider an economy in which agents can choose between investing in new and used capital in order to study the effect of credit constraints on this choice.
The Environment
Consider an economy with overlapping generations. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . At each point in time t, a generation with a continuum of agents with measure one is born. Generations live for one period, that is, for two dates. Agents have identical preferences and access to the same productive technologies, but differ in the idiosyncratic endowment of consumption goods that they are born with, i.e., in the amount of internal funds that they have. The preferences of an agent born in generation t are
where u is strictly increasing and concave and satisfies lim c→0 u (c) = +∞. 6 At time t, each agent observes his idiosyncratic endowment e ∈ E ⊂ R + which is distributed independently and identically with density π(e) on E. At time t, each young agent chooses how much to invest in new and used capital for use in production at time t + 1. The price of new capital is normalized to 1. Used capital, on the other hand, can be bought at a price p u , which will be determined in equilibrium. Used capital will turn out to be cheaper than new capital in terms of its purchase price, i.e., p u < 1, in equilibrium, but it requires maintenance one period after it is bought. That is, investment in a unit of used capital at time t, requires payments of p u at time t and m u > 0 at time t+1. New and used capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. Thus, an agent who invest i u,t in used capital and i n,t in new capital will have a total amount of capital k t = i u,t + i n,t . Capital generates output of f (k t ) = k α t , where α ∈ (0, 1), at time t + 1. Capital depreciates at a rate of δ, such that the agent will have k t+1 = (1 − δ)k t units of capital at time 6 Strict concavity of the utility function is not necessary for our results as long as the production function is concave. Indeed, we could assume linear preferences, i.e., risk neutrality. We discuss below how this can be seen using the marginal rates of transformation as discount rates, rather than marginal rates of substitution.
t + 1. The agent can sell the depreciated capital at time t + 1 as used capital to agents from the next generation. Notice that both new and used capital are sold as used capital after use in production. The idea is that except for the original owner who buys capital new, capital requires maintenance one period after the capital is purchased. Once capital has been previously owned, it is used and it does not matter how many previous owners there were. Notice that our model is consistent with the common perception that the difference between the purchase price and the sale price for new capital is larger than for used capital. Specifically, a unit of new capital is bought at a price of 1 and sold for p u (1 − δ) whereas a unit of used capital is bought for p u and sold for p u (1 − δ). However, this does not imply that the user cost of new capital is necessarily higher than the user cost of used capital since used capital requires maintenance whereas new capital does not.
Furthermore, an agent can borrow or save at a rate of return R = β −1 , which we fix exogenously to focus on the equilibrium in the used capital market. 7 An agent can however only borrow against a fraction 0 ≤ θ < 1 of the resale value of capital and can not borrow against future output. Thus, the agent needs to provide collateral for loans he takes out and the extent of collateralization is limited. This constraint can be motivated by assuming that lenders can only seize a fraction θ of the capital in case of default, which limits how much the agent can credibly promise to repay to that amount. 8 This defines the credit constraint considered here. Agents' investment in used or new capital is constrained by the amount of their initial endowment of internal funds and their limited ability to borrow. Note that θ = 0 is a special case of our model where agents can not borrow at all, neither against output nor against capital. All the results that we obtain in this paper apply to this special case as well. We consider a stationary equilibrium where the price of used capital p u is determined such that all the used capital sold by agents in generation t is bought by agents in generation t + 1. The equilibrium will be stationary in the sense that all quantities, such as investment, the capital stock, and the volume of trade in used capital are constant across periods. We provide a formal definition of a stationary equilibrium in Section 2.3. 7 We could alternatively determine the interest rate R endogenously such that both the used capital market and the credit market clear without affecting our qualitative results. The main difference would be that the discount rate of unconstrained agents would then be one over the equilibrium interest rate 1/R rather than β.
8 See Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for models in a similar spirit.
The Agent's Problem
Consider the problem of an agent in generation t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Since we are studying a stationary model and all generations are identical, we will consider the problem of generation 0 to simplify notation. Taking the price of used capital p u as given, the agent's problem is one of maximizing utility by choice of consumptions {c 0 , c 1 }, investment in used capital i u and new capital i n , and borrowing b, given their initial endowment of internal funds e. Specifically, the agent's problem is
where k ≡ i u + i n and
and
Equations (1-2) are the budget constraints for time 0 and 1, with associated multipliers µ 0 and µ 1 , respectively. The constraints (3-4) require non-negativity of consumption and investment. Constraint (5) is the borrowing constraint which restricts borrowing to a fraction θ of the resale value of capital (in present value terms). The non-negativity constraints on consumption (see equation (3)) do not bind since we have assumed that the utility function satisfies an Inada condition. The multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints for used and new capital investment are λ u , λ n , respectively. The multiplier on the credit constraint is λ b . When this constraint binds (λ b > 0), we will say that the agent is credit constrained, and, that the agent is more credit constrained the larger this multiplier is. Note that at most one of the non-negativity constraints on investment in new and used capital (equation (4)) will be binding, since lim k→0 f (k) = +∞.
Stationary Equilibrium
An economy can be described by the agent's utility function and discount rate along with the technology parameters for the production function, depreciation, and the used capital maintenance cost, the collateralization rate, and the support and distribution over initial endowments of internal funds. Thus, an economy E is defined by E = {u(·), β, α, δ, m u , θ, E, π(e)}. 
∀e ∈ E, t.
(ii) The price of used capital p u is such that the market for used capital clears given p u , i.e., the amount of used capital sold by generation t equals the amount of used capital bought by generation t + 1, ∀t:
The right hand side of the market clearing condition in the above definition is the aggregate amount of used capital bought by each generation. The left hand side is the aggregate amount of capital sold by each generation, which is the sum of the aggregate amount of investment in new capital net of depreciation and the aggregate amount of investment in used capital net of depreciation.
If used capital were not cheap in terms of its purchase price, i.e., if p u ≥ 1, then all agents would buy new capital only, since new capital does not involve maintenance costs. However, if used capital were too cheap, specifically if the purchase price of used capital plus the maintenance costs discounted at β were strictly less than the cost of buying new capital, i.e., if p u + βm u < 1, then all agents would buy used capital and there would be no investment in new capital. Thus, in equilibrium, 1 − βm u ≤ p u < 1. Stated formally:
Proposition 1 The price of used capital satisfies
The proofs of this proposition and all other formal statements are in the appendix unless noted otherwise. Notice that the discount factor for time 1 payoffs of an agent who is not credit constrained is β and the price of used capital in an economy without credit constraints would hence be p u + βm u = 1. The price of used capital simply equals the price of new capital minus the discounted maintenance costs. The case of interest here is the other case, in which p u +βm u > 1, which we will refer to as a credit constrained pricing equilibrium since in this case used capital is not priced as if there were no credit constraints. We study the properties of credit constrained pricing equilibria below. We also discuss the properties of unconstrained pricing equilibria, i.e., equilibria where p u + βm u = 1, and conditions under which an equilibrium with credit constrained pricing obtains, i.e., conditions such that p u + βm u > 1.
Characterization
In this section we first characterize the used and new capital investment decision and equilibrium in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium. Next, we provide an analogous characterization of an unconstrained pricing equilibrium, and finally we provide conditions for a credit constrained pricing equilibrium to obtain.
Characterization of a Credit Constrained Pricing Equilibrium
We first characterize the solution to the agent's problem in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium, i.e., under the assumption that p u + βm u > 1. We show that in such an equilibrium, it is agents with few internal funds who invest in used capital. Indeed, agents with internal funds below a certain thresholdē u invest only in used capital. Agents with internal funds in an intermediate range, i.e., betweenē u and e n >ē u , invest in both new and used capital. Agents with internal funds aboveē n invest in new capital only. Furthermore, the size of an agent's firm measured in units or value of capital is increasing in e. The size of an agent's firm is strictly increasing belowē u , is constant betweenē u andē n , and then strictly increasing again abovē e n until internal funds reachē >ē n . Agents with internal funds aboveē are unconstrained and their level of investment, and hence the size of their firm, is constant and equal to the unconstrained optimal firm size. Thus, agents with few internal funds are credit constrained, start smaller firms, and invest in used capital.
First, note that in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium, any agent who invests a positive amount in used capital must be credit constrained, that is, the multiplier on that agent's credit constraint must be strictly positive. This is stated formally in the following proposition.
Thus, one can observe how credit constrained an agent in this economy is through revealed preference in their choice between new and used capital.
9 This seems an interesting implication, since identifying credit constrained firms has remained a challenge in the corporate finance literature.
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Next, we characterize the solution to the agent's problem as a function of e, the endowment or internal funds of the agent. The characterization is summarized in the next proposition:
There exist three cutoff levels of internal fundsē u <ē n <ē such that the solution to the agent's problem satisfies:
9 See Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2000) for a related study of the decision to borrow in the auto loan market as a function of loan price and maturity for constrained and unconstrained consumers.
10 See for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Réquejo (2001) , and Whited and Wu (2003) .
The last part of Proposition 3 is useful for studying the numerical example provided in Section 3 below where we specify u(c) =
. To understand this characterization in terms of total investment, notice that agents in this economy effectively have three ways to carry funds from time 0 to time 1. First, they can invest in the concave production technology. Second, they can save at a rate of return R = β −1 which is constant. Third, by substituting new capital for used capital they can invest 1 − p u at time 0 for a return of m u , in terms of foregone maintenance costs, at time 1. The return on such a substitution is m u /(1 − p u ) > β −1 and thus exceeds the rate of return on savings in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium. Hence, an agent first invests using the concave production technology until the marginal return reaches m u /(1 − p u ). At that point the agent starts to substitute from used capital to new capital at a constant return of m u /(1 − p u ) while keeping the capital stock constant atk. Once he has fully substituted to new capital, he starts to increase the investment in the concave production technology again until the marginal return reaches β −1 . Thereafter, he saves at the constant return β −1 and keeps the capital stock atk. The decision to invest in used and new capital depends on the agent's initial endowment of internal funds. Because of the credit constraint, the values of used vs. new capital are agent specific and depend on the level of internal funds. That is, the multipliers on the borrowing constraints drive wedges between the valuations of agents with differing levels of internal funds. This is related to the result in the literature studying investment with financing constraints which shows that constrained firms make investment decisions which reflect the higher discount rate induced by binding credit constraints.
11 This can be seen by considering the first order conditions with respect to i u and i n which can be written as:
The terms on the right hand side of equations (6) and (7) reflect the return on investing in used and new capital, respectively, in terms of output, resale value of capital, and shadow value of collateral. Since used and new capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production the returns are the same. The terms on the left hand side reflect the cost of investing in used capital µ 0 p u + µ 1 m u and new capital µ 0 , respectively. New and used capital can be valued for agents in each of the three endowment regions using the appropriate marginal rates of substitution. Since agents with internal funds betweenē u andē n invest in both new and used capital, the multipliers λ u and λ n are both zero and hence the shadow price of used capital for these agents satisfies:
where we have used the fact that µ 0 (e) = u (c 0 (e)) and µ 1 (e) = βu (c 1 (e)). This means that from the vantage point of an agent in this intermediate range, the shadow price of used capital equals the shadow price of new capital. Notice that the shadow price (or user cost) of used capital is agent specific and depends on the agent's endowment. Agents with internal funds less thanē u however invest in used capital only and in this range λ n > 0. Thus, from their vantage point used capital is relatively cheap, i.e., the shadow price of used capital satisfies:
Finally, for agents who invest in new capital only, i.e., agents with internal funds exceedingē n , λ u > 0 and thus these agents consider new capital relatively cheaper than used capital:
New and used capital can also be valued for agents in each of the three endowment regions using the appropriate marginal rates of transformation.
12 This also shows that with concave production technologies, even risk neutral agents would pay a premium for used capital if they were credit constrained and thus entrepreneurial risk aversion is not essential for our results. For agents with endowments betweenē u andē n we have:
These agents invest in both new and used capital, hence the value of a unit of used capital must equal the value of a unit of new capital evaluated at the marginal rate 12 Marginal rates of transformation have also been used to value assets in the production based asset pricing literature following Cochrane (1991 Cochrane ( , 1996 , including Restoy and Rockinger (1994) and Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003) . of transformation implied by the level of capital chosen by agents with endowments in this region. Notice that these are the marginal rates of transformation for internal funds. For example, an extra unit of used capital costs p u , but allows extra borrowing of βθp u (1 − δ), and thus costs p u (1 − βθ(1 − δ)) in internal funds. The return on used capital is f (k) in terms of output, p u (1 − δ)(1 − θ) in terms of resale value net of loan repayment, and requires a maintenance payment of m u , thus
The marginal rate of transformation for new capital has a similar interpretation. Recall that the optimal choice for capital (the sum of new and used capital investment) is increasing in initial endowment. For agents with internal funds less thanē u we have:
Thus, used capital is cheaper than new capital valued at the marginal rate of transformation for the most constrained agents. By investing in used capital, constrained agents can operate larger firms. Finally, for agents with internal funds exceedingē n we have:
which means that used capital is more expensive than new capital when valued by these unconstrained agents. Two implications of the equilibrium pricing of used capital in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium are notable here. First, used capital is made expensive to unconstrained investors by the fact that it provides a convenience yield to constrained investors by relaxing their credit constraints and this makes these agents willing to pay more for used capital. Second, the premium at which used capital trades means that unconstrained agents invest more in equilibrium because they can sell capital at a premium in the used capital market. Of course, this is also true for used capital investment, however in this case the premium affects both the purchase and selling price.
Characterization of an Unconstrained Pricing Equilibrium
We now consider the properties of an equilibrium with unconstrained pricing. The characterization is quite similar to the one in a credit constrained pricing equilibrium. In particular, agents with few internal funds are credit constrained, buy only used capital, and start smaller firms. There are two main differences, however. The first difference is that investment in new capital is not uniquely determined for all agents. The minimum amount an agent invests in used capital, however, is uniquely determined and has the same properties as before. The minimum investment in used capital is 100% of investment for agents with internal funds below some threshold e u , then decreases over an interval of intermediate values of internal funds between e u andē n , and is zero aboveē n . The second difference is that in an unconstrained pricing equilibrium there is no region besides the region belowē u where an agent's total investment is increasing. The third region of Proposition 3 thus collapses, i.e., e n =ē using the notation of that proposition.
13 The characterization of the agent's problem is summarized in Proposition 4 below. To see that investment in new capital is not uniquely determined consider the following argument: Any agent who is willing to invest a positive amount in new capital would be indifferent between doing so and raising the investment in used capital by a small amount while reducing his investment in new capital by the same small amount and reducing borrowing (or increasing savings) by the difference. Specifically, increasing i u by ∆ and reducing i n by the same amount frees up (1 − p u )∆ units of consumption at date 0. Reducing borrowing (or increasing savings) b by that amount leaves consumption at date 0 unchanged, and pays off R(1 − p u )∆ at date 1. Maintenance costs at date 1 increase by m u ∆, but the reduction in borrowing (or increase in savings) exactly covers that. Thus consumption at date 1 is not affected either.
We denote the minimum investment in used capital, which is determined uniquely given the agent's internal funds e, by i min u and the corresponding maximum investment in new capital by i max n . Similarly, we denote the implied maximum borrowing by b max . The solution can then be characterized as follows:
Proposition 4 Suppose p u +βm u = 1. There exist two cutoff levels of internal funds e u <ē n such that the solution to the agent's problem satisfies:
(ii) Forē u < e <ē n , i
13 The reason is that in an equilibrium with unconstrained pricing the return on saving, R = β −1 , equals the return on substituting new capital for used capital, m u /(1 − p u ) = β −1 .
(iii) For e ≥ē n , i max n > 0, i min u = 0, and, for e >ē n , b max < βθp u (i u + i n )(1 − δ).
Conditions for a Credit Constrained Pricing Equilibrium
We can now determine the conditions for the equilibrium to have unconstrained pricing versus credit constrained pricing. The maximum aggregate amount of new capital sold after one period given unconstrained pricing, i.e., p u + βm u = 1, is
while the minimum aggregate net amount of used capital investment given unconstrained pricing is
Notice that both these expressions involve only parameters since p u = 1 − βm u in an unconstrained pricing equilibrium. From Definition 1, market clearing requires that
Thus, if
then unconstrained agents are willing to invest more than enough in new capital to satisfy the net demand for used capital. This means that the marginal used capital investor is an unconstrained agent and hence we have an equilibrium with unconstrained pricing. However, if the converse is true, then some constrained agents need to invest in new capital and hence the marginal agent pricing used capital is constrained. Hence, a credit constrained pricing equilibrium obtains under the following condition:
Numerical Example
To illustrate and compare credit constrained and unconstrained pricing equilibria, we present two example economies. We will refer to the credit constrained pricing equilibrium as "CCPE," and the unconstrained pricing equilibrium as "UPE." In particular, we study the premium used capital trades at in the CCPE economy and the decision to invest in used vs. new capital as a function of agents' initial internal funds. The only difference in primitives between the two economies is the distribution over endowments of internal funds. To construct a CCPE, we know that Condition 1 must be satisfied. In the CCPE economy, the distribution over endowments is exponential on the state space, so that there are more agents with low endowments than high endowments, whereas endowments are distributed uniformly in the UPE economy. Thus, the internal funds distribution determines whether used capital trades at a premium and the magnitude of this premium. This has a couple of interesting implications. First, in the cross section, it implies that used capital should trade at a higher premium in industries (or countries) with more firms with low levels of internal funds. Second, over the business cycle, it implies that the relative shadow price of used capital is, ceteris paribus, higher in recessions, which means that used capital is an even worse deal for unconstrained firms in bad times. For preferences, we specify that u(c) =
so that the last part of Proposition 3 applies, and set γ = 2. We think of one period as a year and set β = 0.96. Used and new capital are perfect substitutes in the production function, f (k) = k α , with α = 0.33. All capital depreciates at a rate δ = 0.12. The differences between used and new capital are that new capital is purchased at a price of one and requires no maintenance, while the price of used capital is determined in equilibrium and incorporates the maintenance cost m u which we set to 0.50. 14 We set the collateralization rate θ equal to 0.20, such that agents can promise to pay up to 20% of the resale value of their capital. We solve the model on a discretized state and choice space. The choice space for investment in new and used capital (i u and i n ) and borrowing (b) is chosen to impose the borrowing constraint and such that the boundaries do not impose additional constraints at the solution. We endow agents with initial internal funds between 0.05 and 1.75. For the CCPE economy the distribution over endowments is exponential on the state space, with 50% of agents endowed with internal funds of 0.20 or less. The UPE economy has uniformly distributed endowments, so that 50% of agents are endowed with internal funds of 0.90 or less. Table 1 presents the parameters which define the two example economies. We first discuss the results for the CCPE economy. Used capital trades at a premium of 2.85% in the CCPE. Under unconstrained pricing, the price of used capital equals the price of new capital (one) minus βm u , which equals 0.52 under our assumptions, while in the CCPE p u = 0.5485 and the shadow price of used capital is p u + βm u = 1.0285. The fact that agents with low endowments, who are credit constrained, can start larger firms by investing in used capital (that is, used capital relaxes credit constraints for these agents) means that used capital earns a convenience yield which raises the equilibrium price of used capital. The price of used capital in the CCPE and UPE economies is presented in Table 2 along with the other equilibrium implications for the two economies.
Next, we describe the investment decisions by agents in the CCPE. As stated in Proposition 3, there are three increasing cutoff levels for internal funds, defining four investment regions. Figure 1 presents the investment and savings decisions, along with the shadow price of used capital, and the multiplier on the borrowing constraint, in the CCPE economy as a function of agents' initial endowments of internal funds. The top left panel plots new and used capital investment. For low endowment levels, belowē u = 0.8469, agents invest only in used capital and investment is increasing in this range. At higher levels of internal funds, betweenē u andē n = 1.2134, agents invest an increasing amount in new capital, and a decreasing amount in used capital. Total investment is constant atk which is 0.3914. Used capital investment reaches zero atē n and agents with endowments greater thanē n invest only in new capital. Betweenē n andē investment in new capital increases until total investment reaches k = 0.4554 atē and capital investment is constant thereafter. Agents in this region are unconstrained and begin to borrow less than their borrowing capacity. The top right panel of Figure 1 plots borrowing. Agents with internal funds belowē borrow up to their borrowing capacity and borrowing is increasing in this range. Aboveē, borrowing is decreasing and agents with lots of internal funds save positive amounts. The middle left panel plots the fraction of capital expenditures comprised by used capital, which decreases monotonically with internal funds. The bottom left panel describes why this is the case along with what motivates the investment decision described above, by plotting the shadow prices for used and new capital as a function of internal funds. The shadow price of new capital is one, and the shadow price of used capital, described in equations (8)-(10), is increasing with the level of internal funds. The shadow price of used capital is less than one for agents who invest only in used capital, equals one in the intermediate region where agents are indifferent between used and new capital, and exceeds one for agents who invest only in new capital and for agents who are unconstrained. Finally, the middle right panel of Figure 1 plots the multiplier on agents' borrowing constraints. This multiplier monotonically decreases with internal funds, and reaches zero for unconstrained agents, who borrow less than their borrowing capacity.
We turn now to the results of the UPE economy for comparison. A UPE is defined by the fact that used capital sells for 1 − βm u = 0.52. The other results for the UPE are similar to those for the CCPE, and are presented in the bottom panel of Table  2 . However, as described in Proposition 4, investment in new capital and savings are only uniquely defined for agents with internal funds less thanē u = 0.8820, who do not purchase any new capital. Agents with higher endowments are indifferent between appropriately combining reduced borrowing with used capital and investing in new capital at the margin. Also, total investment is increasing in initial internal funds only for agents who invest only in used capital. Still, as in the CCPE economy, agents with low endowments invest exclusively in used capital, are constrained, and start smaller firms. Moreover, aboveē u the minimum investment in used capital is monotonically decreasing in agents' endowment, and reaches zero atē n = 1.3001, where maximum borrowing no longer exhausts agents' borrowing capacity. Analogous to Figure 1 for the CCPE economy, Figure 2 presents the investment and borrowing decisions, along with the shadow price of used capital, and the multiplier on the borrowing constraint, in the UPE economy as a function of agents' initial endowment of internal funds. Notice thatē u is higher in the UPE than in the CCPE so agents with higher endowment levels invest exclusively in used capital. This is because the price of used capital is not inflated by the effect of credit constraints. For the same reason, in the UPE unconstrained agents are willing invest in both new and used capital, in contrast to the CCPE. In fact, only unconstrained agents are willing to invest in both used and new capital. To see this, compare the top left and middle right panels of Figure 2 , which plot investment and the multiplier on the borrowing constraint, respectively.
Evidence on Investment in New and Used Capital
Our model predicts that firms with less internal funds are credit constrained, invest more in used capital, and operate smaller firms. We first focus on the prediction that the fraction of investment comprised by used capital and firm size are negatively related and find evidence that used to total capital expenditures are strongly decreasing with firm size. The stylized fact that small firms invest much more in used capital is very robust and, to the best of our knowledge, new. We then provide direct evidence on the link between the fraction of investment in used capital and measures of financial constraints. We find that firms which seem more financially constrained invest more in used capital. It is also interesting to note that, even in the aggregate, small firms are important in used capital markets. Indeed, about thirty percent of aggregate used capital expenditures is done by businesses with no employees, while these businesses contribute only about eight percent of aggregate total capital expenditures.
15 This means that understanding the investment behavior of small, credit-constrained firms is likely important to understanding the behavior of used capital markets. Furthermore, since small, credit-constrained firms have been argued to be particularly sensitive to aggregate fluctuations and central to understanding business cycles and growth, the market for used capital may then be important for understanding this connection.
Data
We use two main data sources for estimates of used capital expenditures, the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS) and the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES), both by the U.S. Census Bureau. The Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS) is a survey of the truck population in the U.S. and provides information about the physical and operational characteristics of trucks in the U.S. We use the publicly available micro data file of the 1997 VIUS.
16 The observation unit in this survey is a truck. To get a sense of the characteristics of capital expenditures on used capital we report the main types of used structures and equipment expenditures in Table 4 based on the 1998 ACES report. Table 5 shows the fraction of used capital expenditures (as percent of total capital expenditures) across industries and shows that there is considerable cross industry variation in the importance of used capital. To study the relationship between used capital expenditures and size using the ACES micro data, we exclude firms with zero assets and only use data for firms with employees since ACES does not contain information about assets of firms without employees.
To study the relationship between used capital expenditures and financial variables we merge the ACES data with data from Compustat using a Census-Compustat bridge file. We restrict the data to the 1998 ACES since that year is a detailed survey year and the data quality is likely higher.
18 Moreover, the annual panel rotation limits the extent to which the panel dimension of the data can be exploited.
Evidence on Used Capital Expenditures and Size
We first provide evidence on the choice between new and used trucks as a function of the size of the fleet using data from the 1997 VIUS. Table 3 presents data for trucks dedicated to business use. Overall, about 50% of trucks were purchased used. This fraction decreases monotonically with fleet size. For example, businesses with fleets of 10 to 24 purchased about 38% of their trucks used, whereas businesses with fleets of 100-499 vehicles purchased only about 24% of their trucks used. Figure 3 displays this information graphically, and for different body types. Businesses with the smallest fleets buy at least 40% of trucks of all body types used, while businesses with the largest fleets buy no more than 37% of trucks of any body type used. Next we provide evidence on the composition of capital expenditures on new vs. used capital for firms of different sizes. Table 6 presents the composition of capital expenditures on new and used structures and equipment for companies with and without employees using data from the ACES reports. Clearly, small companies (i.e., companies without employees) invest a larger fraction of their capital expenditures in used capital. The fraction of capital expenditures comprised by used capital for small firms is about five times the fraction for large firms. This pattern is robust across years and is similar for structures and equipment. Moreover, the composition of capital expenditures in terms of structures vs. equipment is similar for firms with and without employees, which suggests that firms with and without employees operate similar technologies and the main difference between them is whether the capital is purchased new or used.
Moreover, Table 7 presents the average ratio of used capital expenditures to total capital expenditures across firm size deciles using ACES micro data from 1993 to 2002. We measure firm size using assets at the beginning of the year.
19 Used capital comprises 27% of capital expenditures for firms in the lowest asset decile (with assets below $0.10 million) and 10% for firms in the highest asset decile (with assets exceeding $186.55 million) and this fraction decreases monotonically across asset deciles (see also Figure 4 ). Thus, we conclude that small firms invest more in used capital than large firms. The relationship between size and used capital expenditures is robust and can be documented for a large universe of firms, including non-public firms for which financial data is unavailable. The idea that small firms are more likely to be credit constrained is also supported by studies of the effects of credit constraints on investment. For example, Whited and Wu (2003) report that for both their index of credit constraints, as well as the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index used by Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Réquejo (2001) , average firm assets decrease monotonically with the degree 19 Details of the data construction are given in Table 7 .
of financial constraints. Moreover, classic models of borrowing constraints link internal funds to the degree of financial constraints. 20 Likewise, in our model small firms are constrained and have a larger multiplier on their borrowing constraint. The effect of credit constraints is manifested in the composition of investment in terms of new and used capital and in firm size.
Evidence on Used Capital Expenditures and Financial
Variables
This section provides direct evidence on the link between the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital and measures of financial constraints. We use the ACES micro data for the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital and data from Compustat for the financial variables. Table 9 reports the results of crosssectional regressions using data for 1998. We provide estimates from regressions of the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital on various financial variables, an intercept, and industry dummies. We first provide regressions on each financial variable individually, then on size and individual financial variables, and finally on all variables simultaneously. The details of the variables used and descriptive statistics are in Table 8 . Overall, the estimates suggest that there is a significant relationship with the predicted sign between the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital and the financial variables. Indeed, the results are quite similar for the regressions on each financial variable individually and on size and individual financial variables. Thus, the financial variables contain additional information relative to size alone. Moreover, when all variables are included simultaneously, the results remain essentially unchanged. The fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is significantly lower for larger firms, for firms which pay higher dividends (relative to assets), and for firms with more cash (relative to assets), and significantly higher for firms with more long-term debt (relative to assets). The effect of cash flow to assets is poorly estimated; the point estimates are negative individually and when controlling for size, and positive when all variables are included simultaneously, but the estimates are indistinguishable from zero. Tobin's q enters with a positive sign, i.e., firms with higher Tobin's q buy more used capital, but the effect is only significant (at the 10% level) when all variables are included. A positive sign here is consistent with the idea that firms which have investment opportunities are more constrained. Moreover, all our significant estimates have the same sign as those found by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (including the positive sign on Tobin's q) in their estimation of an ordered logit which relates a qualitative measure of financial constraints to these financial variables. The only difference is that in our data cash flow is uninformative. The estimates are also economically important since a one standard deviation change in any of the significant independent variables changes the fraction of used capital expenditures by 1-2%, which is considerable given the mean of 12%.
Notice that when we use the merged ACES-Compustat data we use data for relatively large firms since Compustat firms are publicly held. In terms of the asset deciles from Table 7 we are hence likely only using data for the top few deciles where there is relatively little variation in the average fraction of capital expenditures on used capital (which varies between about 14% and 10% in the top 4 deciles for example). Indeed, the mean of the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is 12% in the merged data (see Table 8 ) which equals the value in the ninth decile. Moreover, more than 50% of the observations in the merged sample must be in the top decile, since the median value of assets is over $650 million (which is considerably above the bottom cutoff of the top decile). Nevertheless, we find a significant relationship between used capital expenditures and measures of financial constraints here. This suggests the following tip of the iceberg hypothesis: To the extent that we can extrapolate from our results using size as the proxy for financial constraints, smaller firms appear considerably financially constrained since the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is much higher (up to 27%) for smaller firms for which we do not have other measures of financial constraints.
Conclusions
This paper develops a model of the decision to invest in new vs. used capital when used capital has a lower purchase price, but requires maintenance payments later on. We find that used capital is valuable to credit constrained agents because it relaxes borrowing constraints. Used capital allows constrained agents to operate larger scale firms by deferring some of the capital costs. This is interesting because it implies that firms' credit constraints can be measured by the composition of their capital expenditures. We find that agents with low levels of internal funds invest more in used capital, are credit constrained, and operate smaller scale firms. Credit constraints imply that discount factors are firm specific and used capital can thus seem cheap from the vantage point of a constrained firm while unconstrained firms consider it expensive.
We present evidence that used capital indeed comprises a much larger fraction of capital expenditures for small firms who are likely to face binding credit constraints. Moreover, the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is significantly related to measures of financial constraints, with more constrained firms using a larger fraction of used capital. The fact that small and credit constrained firms invest in relatively more used capital is important for understanding used capital markets. Our model implies that the fraction of credit constrained firms affects the premium at which used capital trades. Understanding who buys used capital, and why, is also important for studying capital reallocation and aggregate investment dynamics.
In this paper, we focus on the investment decision by firms, however, one can apply the same logic to individual consumers and households to understand used durable goods markets. More generally, our results shed light on the choice between capital vintages and consumer durables of different quality, which are typically motivated by exogenous variation in preferences for vintages or quality.
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that the objective of the agent's problem is concave and the constraint set convex and hence the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. The first order conditions with respect to i u and i n are
and with respect to b is µ 0 = µ 1 β −1 + λ b β −1 , where µ t is the multiplier on date t consumption, λ u and λ n are the multipliers on the non-negativity constraints for i u and i n , respectively, and λ b is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. Subtracting (11) from (12) gives
Thus, if p u ≥ 1, then λ u > 0 (the strict inequality follows from the fact that µ 1 > 0) and hence i u = 0 for all e ∈ E, which is impossible in equilibrium. If p u < 1 − βm u , then using this inequality and (13), we have
and substituting for µ 0 using the first order condition with respect to b we get λ b m u < λ n − λ u . Thus, λ n > 0 and hence i n = 0 for all e ∈ E which is again impossible in equilibrium. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Since i u > 0, λ u = 0, where we have suppressed the dependence on e to simplify notation. Equation (13) together with p u + βm u > 1 and µ 0 = µ 1 β −1 + λ b β −1 then imply that
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that the objective is continuous and strictly concave and that the constraint set is convex and continuous. Thus, by the theorem of the maximum (see, e.g., Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) ), the maximizing choices are continuous in e.
First, suppose i u > 0 where we suppress the dependence on e for simplicity. Then, by Proposition 2, λ b > 0, i.e., b = βθp u (i u + i n )(1 − δ). Consider the case where i n = 0. Then the first order condition with respect to i u , equation (11), can be written as (14) where we substituted for λ b using µ 0 = µ 1 β −1 + λ b β −1 . By totally differentiating we
Next, consider the case where both i u > 0 and i n > 0, such that the first order conditions with respect to i u and i n are, again substituting for λ b ,
Dividing equation (16) by equation (17) implies
and thus k is uniquely determined and constant in this range and equalsk =
At the upper boundary of this region, the capitalk is entirely made up by new capital. Equation (17) can then be written as
which implicitly defines the upper bound on internal fundsē n . If u(c) = c 1−γ 1−γ and using equation (18), we can solve forē n :
At the lower boundary of the region, the agent only invest in used capital and hence
which implicitly defines the lower bound on internal fundsē u . Proceeding as above, Comparing (19) and (20) 
) and thusē u <ē n . Finally, suppose i n > 0 and i u = 0. Consider the case where λ b > 0 and hence b = βθp u i n (1 − δ). Then equation (12), again substituting for λ b , can be written as
By totally differentiating we get
In the case where λ b = 0 we have µ 0 = β −1 µ 1 and hence c 0 = c 1 and the agent is unconstrained. The first order condition with respect to i n then implies that
which means that investment is constant andk = (α
Notice also that in a credit constrained pricing equilibriumk <k. At the lower boundary of this region, savings b equal βθp uk (1 − δ) and since u (c 0 ) = u (c 1 ) we have
. In a credit constrained pricing equilibriumē n <ē.
Since the maximizing choices are continuous functions, we conclude that the agent invests in used capital only belowē u , invests in new and used capital betweenē u and ē n , and in new capital only aboveē n . Moreover, the agent is credit constrained below e and unconstrained above that value. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall from equation (13) that
where the second equality uses the fact that µ 0 = µ 1 β −1 + λ b β −1 and p u + βm u = 1.
Hence, λ b m u = λ n − λ u . But this implies that λ u = 0, ∀e ∈ E, since λ n and λ u can not both be strictly positive. Moreover, λ n = 0 if and only if λ b = 0. Suppose λ b > 0 and hence b = βθp u i u (1 − δ) and i n = 0. Then, i u solves equation (14) and, totally differentiating, we have diu de > 0 (see equation (15)). Suppose λ b = 0, and hence λ n = 0 and µ 0 = µ 1 β −1 . Equation (12) then implies that 1 = β(αk α−1 + p u (1 − δ)) which is solved byk as defined in the proposition. Now agents in this range are indifferent between investing in new and used capital at the margin. However, we can determine the minimum used capital investment that is required for given e. At the margin, investing in new capital instead of used capital is equivalent to investing in used capital and reducing borrowing by the difference 1 − p u . Thus, the way to obtain a capital stock ofk while saving the minimum amount is by investing in used capital only. At the lower boundary of the region, the agent invest in used capital only and borrowing is b max = βθp uk (1 − δ). Moreover, since λ b = 0, we have
Thus, the minimum used capital investment atē u is i min u =k. Aboveē u , the minimum used capital investment, which implies b max = βθp uk (1 − δ), decreases since c 1 must be increasing in e and
. At the upper boundary of this region, the agent invests in new capital only and b max = βθp uk (1 − δ), and
=k, and b max < βθp uk (1 − δ). 2 The table shows the coefficients of a regression of the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital on various financial variables (controlling for industry dummies at the three digit level in NAICS codes 3, 4, and 5, and at the two digit level in other industries). Heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. Data is micro data from a cross section of firms from the 1998 ACES for the dependent variable, used capital expenditures over total capital expenditures, and for the industry dummies, and from Compustat for financial variables. For a detailed definition of the variables see the description in Table 8 . 
